A Bargaining Game Model for Estimating Efficiency of the Multi-stage Network with Fixed Cost Allocation and its Applications
Subject Areas : Labor and Demographic EconomicsKayvan Moradipour 1 , Sanaz Asadi Rahmati 2 , Elham Abdali 3
1 - Assistant Professor, Department of Mathematics, Technical and Vocational
University (TVU), Tehran, Iran.
2 - PhD Student, Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Technical and Vocational University, Tehran, Iran
3 - Lecturer, Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Technical and Vocational University, Tehran, Iran
Keywords: Fixed Cost, Bargaining Game, Multi-stage Network, JEL Classification: C710, C780. keywords: Network Data Envelopment Analysis,
Abstract :
In this paper, a bargaining game model is extended to evaluate the efficiency of decision making units with a multi-stage network structure. Moreover, each stage of network data envelopment analysis (DEAN) is considered as a game player. Accordingly, the allocated fixed cost is divided among all the stages such that the best allocation is made to the best stage. With a newer idea, the intermediate stage in the data envelopment analysis of three-stage networks is considered as a common player in the bargaining game, so that the stage plays a significant role in maximizing the performance of network. Next, an alternative approach to allocating a common fixed cost in a multi-stage network based on the bargaining game is proposed. Finally, as direct apllication of the performance of the proposed models some examples are given.
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