Central Bank Transparency and Capital Market Reaction: A Systematic Review

محورهای موضوعی : Financial Accounting

Mehdi Moazzami ¹ , Mohsen Rasoulian ² , Mohammad Hossein Vadiei Nowghabi ³ , Meysam Arabzadeh ⁴ , Esmail Mazroui Nasrabadi ⁵

1 - Department of Management and Accounting, Kashan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Kashan, Iran
2 - Department of Management and Accounting, Kashan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Kashan, Iran
3 - Department of Accounting, Faculty of Administrative and Economic science, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran
4 - Department of Accounting, Kashan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Kashan,Iran
5 - Department of Business Administration Faculty of Financial Science, Management and Entrepreneurship, University of Kashan, Kashan, Iran

تاریخ دریافت : 1401/10/09 تاریخ پذیرش : 1401/12/13 تاریخ انتشار : 1402/12/07

کلید واژه: capital market reaction, central bank transparency, monetary policy decisions, systematic review,

چکیده مقاله :

In an expansive test of nations over distinctive geographic districts and over a long period of time, we discover restricted nation and variable-specific impacts of central bank straightforwardness on figure exactness and their scattering among an expansive set of proficient figures of monetary and macroeconomic factors. More communication indeed increments estimate mistakes and scattering. So the aim at this study is a systematic review of central bank transparency and capital market reaction. This study was conducted using a systematic review. At first all papers (n=165) related to keywords (capital market reaction and central bank transparency) searched for Persian and English databases; Google, Google scholar, PubMed covering the period from 2012 through 2022 was performed. Then all qualitative and quantitative papers related to central bank transparency selected and analyzed (n=28). As a result to inclusion and exclusion criteria, papers related to central bank transparency were found and analyzed (n=28). Predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria were: papers related to central bank transparency, papers were Persian and English, types of papers were original and all the papers were free full text. In the initial search, 165 papers were found that after reviewing the titles and abstract articles and removing repetitive and non-related, 54 possible related articles were investigated. Of these, 31 papers were omitted from the abstract because of lack of access to the original article and lack of sufficient information. Finally, 28 papers were included in the study. There are very few studies that have examined the effect of central bank transparency on capital market turmoil. The effect of central bank transpar-ency on the domestic capital market has not been studied. There is no agreement in the literature on theoretical discussions on whether increasing central bank transparency affects capital market turmoil. In foreign research, we can also refer to the study of Dinser and Eichngreen (2007) who have studied this effect empirically using the main transparency index. The pre-sent systematic review shows that almost whole of papers on central bank transparency and capital market reaction highlighted similar findings con-cerning monetary policy decisions.

چکیده انگلیسی:

In an expansive test of nations over distinctive geographic districts and over a long period of time, we discover restricted nation and variable-specific impacts of central bank straightforwardness on figure exactness and their scattering among an expansive set of proficient figures of monetary and macroeconomic factors. More communication indeed increments estimate mistakes and scattering. So the aim at this study is a systematic review of central bank transparency and capital market reaction. This study was conducted using a systematic review. At first all papers (n=165) related to keywords (capital market reaction and central bank transparency) searched for Persian and English databases; Google, Google scholar, PubMed covering the period from 2012 through 2022 was performed. Then all qualitative and quantitative papers related to central bank transparency selected and analyzed (n=28). As a result to inclusion and exclusion criteria, papers related to central bank transparency were found and analyzed (n=28). Predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria were: papers related to central bank transparency, papers were Persian and English, types of papers were original and all the papers were free full text. In the initial search, 165 papers were found that after reviewing the titles and abstract articles and removing repetitive and non-related, 54 possible related articles were investigated. Of these, 31 papers were omitted from the abstract because of lack of access to the original article and lack of sufficient information. Finally, 28 papers were included in the study. There are very few studies that have examined the effect of central bank transparency on capital market turmoil. The effect of central bank transpar-ency on the domestic capital market has not been studied. There is no agreement in the literature on theoretical discussions on whether increasing central bank transparency affects capital market turmoil. In foreign research, we can also refer to the study of Dinser and Eichngreen (2007) who have studied this effect empirically using the main transparency index. The pre-sent systematic review shows that almost whole of papers on central bank transparency and capital market reaction highlighted similar findings con-cerning monetary policy decisions.

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